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Abstract 
The transition from Fordism to the knowledge economy in the advanced democracies 
was underpinned by the ICT revolution. The introduction and rapid diffusion of ICT 
pushed up wages for college-educated workers with complementary skills and allowed 
top managers and CEOs to reap greater rewards for their talents. Despite these 
common pressures, income inequality did not rise to the same extent everywhere; the 
Anglo-Saxon countries stand out as being particularly unequal. To shed new light on 
this puzzle, we carry out a panel data analysis of 18 OECD countries between 1970 
and 2007. The analysis stands apart from the existing empirical literature by taking a 
comparative perspective. We look at the extent to which the relationship between the 
knowledge economy and income inequality is influenced by national labour market 
institutions. We find that the expansion of knowledge employment is positively 
associated with both the 90–10 wage ratio and the income share of the top 1%, but 
that these effects are mitigated by the presence of strong labour market institutions, 
such as coordinated wage bargaining, strict employment protection legislation and 
high bargaining coverage. The study provides robust evidence against the argument 
that industrial relations systems are no longer important safeguards of wage solidarity 
in the knowledge economy. 
 
Keywords: knowledge economy, income inequality, labour market institutions, 
   industrial relations systems 
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1. Introduction 
 
The last forty years has seen a pervasive rise in income inequality across the 
advanced democracies of Western Europe, North America and the Asia–Pacific region 
(Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; OECD 2011, 2015), especially at the very top of the 
income distribution (Alvaredo et al. 2013; Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2011; Piketty 
2014). This has occurred alongside major structural change, which has seen these 
economies transition from Fordism—an economic system built around the mass 
production and mass consumption of standardized consumer goods—to the 
knowledge economy, where the service sectors dominate economic activity and 
human capital is central to economic prosperity (Iversen and Soskice 2015; Wren 
2013b). 
The two phenomena are intimately linked. The information and communications 
technology (ICT) revolution that underpinned the transition to the knowledge economy 
increased the demand for college-educated workers with complementary skills, which 
led to a rise in the wage premia for more educated workers (Acemoglu and Autor 2011; 
Goldin and Katz 2008; Katz and Autor 1999). The ICT revolution and globalization also 
allowed highly-talented managers, CEOs and entrepreneurs to apply their talent to a 
much wider pool of resources and to reach a substantially larger audience than 
possible in previous generations. The rapidly rising compensation of the top 1% in the 
knowledge economy therefore reflects both the increasing complexity of their work 
and their enhanced ability to reap the rewards of their talents (Brynjolfsson and 
McAfee 2014; Kaplan and Rauh 2013; Mankiw 2013). 
The transition to the knowledge economy began in earnest after the crisis of 
Fordism in the 1970s. Figure 1 shows the employment expansion in knowledge-
intensive service sectors between 1970 and 2006. Knowledge-intensive services 
include finance, insurance, business services and telecommunications. These 
‘dynamic service sectors’ have been selected by Wren (2013a, 13) as they are ICT 
intensive, high productivity and increasingly traded internationally. The expansion of 
knowledge-intensive services since 1970 is ubiquitous across the advanced 
democracies and represents a substantial shift in economic structure. 
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Figure 1. The expansion of employment in knowledge-intensive services in 
advanced democracies between 1970 and 2006 
 
Note: Knowledge-intensive services comprise three sectors: post and telecommunications; financial 
intermediation; and renting of machinery and equipment and other business activities. 
Source: EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts: November 2009 Release, updated March 2011; 
O’Mahony and Timmer (2009). 
 
While the transition to the knowledge economy has put upward pressure on inequality 
in all the advanced democracies, we have observed striking differences in the 
inequality trajectories of different economies. Figure 2 shows the evolution of two 
widely-used measures of income inequality: the income share of the top 1% and the 
90–10 wage ratio. It is clear that inequality has grown more rapidly in the English-
speaking countries than in the continental and northern European economies (see 
also, Alvaredo et al. 2013; Atkinson and Piketty 2007). 
The UK and the US particularly stand out, and as we might expect, they have also 
seen a large employment expansion in knowledge-intensive services. The two 
countries that saw the biggest movement into knowledge-intensive services, however, 
were the Netherlands and Belgium, where the growth of inequality has been much 
more subdued. On top of this, the other continental and northern Europe economies 
saw equivalent or greater expansions in knowledge-intensive services than the other 
English-speaking countries (Australia, Canada and Ireland), but experienced 
substantially smaller rises in inequality. This leaves us with a clear puzzle: given the 
common pressures from the transition to the knowledge economy, why has income 
inequality not risen to the same extent across the advanced democracies? 
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Figure 2. Dependent variables: the income share of the top 1 % and the 90–10 wage ratio 
 
              90–10 wage ratio (left axis)           Income share of the top 1% (right axis) 
   
   
   
   
  
   
Note: No top 1% income share data is available for Austria, Belgium or Greece. 
Source: World Wealth & Income Database (data accessed September 2017); Brady, Huber and Stephens (2014); 
OECD, Labour Force Statistics (accessed 14 Jan 2013).
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Despite the wealth of theoretical and empirical evidence on how labour markets and 
inequality have been affected by technological progress, there are only a few cross-
country empirical analyses that estimate the effects of the transition to the knowledge 
economy on income inequality in the advanced democracies (Huber, Huo, and 
Stephens 2017; Kwon and Roberts 2015; Kwon 2014; Rohrbach 2009). These studies 
use a range of different measures of the knowledge economy and income inequality, 
but typically find that the expansion of employment in knowledge-intensive sectors is 
positively associated with income inequality.1 This emerging empirical literature has 
advanced our understanding of the relationship between technological and structural 
change and income inequality, but cannot account for why some advanced 
democracies have managed to simultaneously expand employment in knowledge-
intensive services and maintain relatively high wage solidarity across the workforce, 
while others have not. 
The analysis in this paper aims to shed new light on this puzzle by taking a 
comparative perspective. There is a large body of empirical work in comparative 
political economy that finds that labour market institutions, such as coordinated wage 
bargaining, trade unions and employment protection legislation, help restrain 
dispersion in the distribution of income (Bradley et al. 2003; Checchi and Garcia 2010; 
Martelli 2017; Pontusson 2005; Pontusson, Rueda, and Way 2002; Roberts and Kwon 
2017; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Wallerstein 1999). There has yet to be a cross-
country empirical study, however, that investigates whether labour market institutions 
can diminish the effects of the transition to the knowledge economy on income 
inequality. 
We fill this gap in the literature by carrying out a panel data econometric analysis 
using an unbalanced dataset that covers 18 OECD countries from 1970 to 2007. We 
investigate whether the effect of the knowledge economy on inequality varies across 
countries with different labour market institutions. The results show that the expansion 
of dynamic services increases income inequality, but that this effect is mitigated by the 
presence of coordinated wage setting, strict employment protection legislation, and 
high bargaining coverage. In contrast, trade union density does not significantly affect 
the relationship between knowledge employment and income inequality. 
Our results show that industrial relations systems have played a significant part in 
keeping income inequality in check in continental and northern Europe during the 
transition to the knowledge economy. This stands in contrast to the recent comparative 
political economy literature that argues that industrial relations systems have been 
superseded by redistribution and education spending as the key safeguards against 
income inequality in the knowledge economy (Iversen and Soskice 2015; Martin and 
Thelen 2007; Thelen 2014). 
                                                             
1
 The exception to this is Huber, Huo, and Stephens (2017), who find a significant negative effect of 
knowledge-intensive services on top incomes. This finding and the issues around the measurement of 
the knowledge economy will be discussed further in Section 3. 
III Working paper 18                                               David Hope and Angelo Martelli 
 
8 
 
2. The knowledge economy, labour market institutions, and income 
inequality 
 
The post-industrial era has been marked by a dramatic increase in income inequality 
within the advanced democracies. The richest households in society have typically 
pulled away from the rest (Alvaredo et al. 2013; Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2011; 
Piketty 2014) and incomes have become more dispersed across the spectrum 
(Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; OECD 2011, 2015). Identifying the factors driving 
income inequality has therefore been at the top of the agenda for many scholars and 
policy makers, especially in the wake of the global financial crisis. A large theoretical 
and empirical literature has identified many potential explanations for the changes 
observed in inequality in the advanced democracies. 
Goldin and Katz (2007, 2008) suggest that educational investment (i.e. the supply 
of skills) has not kept pace with technological advancement (i.e. the demand for skills) 
in the US, which has put upward pressure on the wages of skilled workers. Huber and 
Stephens (2014) find evidence supporting the Goldin–Katz hypothesis in a wider panel 
data analysis of OECD economies. The supply and demand of skills is likely to be less 
important for explaining the diverging income of the top 1%, however, where tax policy, 
changes in the bargaining power of managers and employees, the greater 
individualisation of pay, and capital income are found to be more salient (Alvaredo et 
al. 2013). 
Other scholars have highlighted the rise in international trade liberalizations 
(Milanovic and Squire 2005), finding that trade tariffs reductions led to increased 
inequality. Cross-country studies on inequality and globalization have found that 
measures of trade and capital account integration, such as southern import 
penetration and outward investment flows, have significant positive effects on within-
country inequality, but are less pertinent to explaining cross-country differences 
(Alderson and Nielsen 2002). Although, Lee, Nielsen, and Alderson (2007) find that 
these globalization effects are mitigated in countries with larger public sectors. 
The growth in financial sectors and the financial labour force has been identified 
as another important driver of greater wage disparities and the concentration of 
income in the most affluent households (Flaherty 2015; Godechot 2016; Jacob Assa 
2012; Kus 2012). Summarising this literature, Kwon and Roberts (2017) argue that the 
financialization of the advanced democracies shifted economic resources away from 
rank-and-file production workers to financial workers and the households at the top of 
the income distribution. 
Despite the wide-ranging explanations put forward for changes in income 
inequality, technological change and labour market institutions remain the two 
dominant factors in the political economy literature (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003; 
Iversen and Soskice 2015; Katz and Autor 1999; Pontusson, Rueda, and Way 2002; 
Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Wallerstein 1999). These two factors are the focus of our 
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paper. In the remainder of the literature review, we look at the direct effects of 
technological change and labour market institutions on income inequality, before 
turning to the potential interaction effect between the two factors that is at the heart of 
the empirical analysis in this paper. 
 
2.1. The knowledge economy and inequality 
 
The advanced democracies have undergone a major technologically-driven structural 
transformation since the 1970s. The Fordist system of the post-WWII era was built on 
the dual pillars of mass production and mass consumption, and was supported by 
collective bargaining, a generous welfare state, and Keynesian demand management 
policies. This system collapsed under the weight of short-term factors, such as 
industrial conflict and oil price shocks, and longer term factors, such as globalization, 
de-unionization and technological change (Hope and Soskice 2016). The knowledge 
economy that arose in its place is distinct from what went before in a number of ways. 
Manufacturing has receded in importance and service sectors now dominate 
economic activity. Complementarities in production between skilled and semi-skilled 
workers have been replaced by complementarities between skilled workers and new 
information and communications technologies. These changes have brought about a 
huge increase in skill and education levels of big segments of the labour force, 
facilitated through the rapid expansion of higher education (Iversen and Soskice 
2015). The welfare state, collective bargaining and labour unions have generally 
declined in importance over time, but there are still salient and theoretically interesting 
differences in political–economic institutions among the advanced democracies in the 
knowledge economy (Iversen and Soskice 2012; Pontusson 2005; Schneider and 
Paunescu 2012). 
The information and communication technology (ICT) revolution that underpinned 
the transition to the knowledge economy has been found to be one a key driver behind 
the upward trend of earnings inequality. Chen, Förster, and Llena-nozal (2013) carry 
out a cross-national study into the drivers of inequality in OECD countries and find that 
technological change (measured by ICT intensity, R&D expenditure and patents) 
significantly widens wage dispersion and accounts for more of the within-country 
variation in inequality than trade or financial factors. 
The diffusion of ICT throughout the advanced democracies created a sharp upturn 
in demand for college-educated workers, because their high-level, general skills are 
complements in production to ICT. The additional demand for skilled workers that 
came with these new technologies led to a rise in the relative wages of more educated 
workers (Acemoglu and Autor 2011; Goldin and Katz 2008; Katz and Autor 1999). The 
losers from technological change have typically been those workers in the middle of 
the skill distribution, whose jobs focus on routine tasks that can be easily be replicated 
by computers or machines (Autor and Dorn 2013; Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2006; 
Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003; Goos and Manning 2007; Goos, Manning, and 
Salomons 2009, 2014; Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenen 2014). 
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The knowledge economy also contributed to the rapid rise in the income of the top 
1% during the post-industrial era. Murphy and Zábojník (2004) provide a market-based 
explanation for the explosion of CEO pay in the knowledge economy, arguing that the 
skills needed to manage a modern corporation are much more focused on general, 
transferable skills (e.g. management, economics, accounting, computing etc.) than the 
firm-specific knowledge that was important in the pre-digital era, and this has created 
a highly competitive global market for the best CEOs. The integration of capital and 
goods markets that came with ICT and globalization also allows highly-talented 
managers, CEOs and entrepreneurs to operate in more markets and reach more 
customers. The rapidly rising compensation of the top 1% in the knowledge economy 
therefore reflects both their superior ability to reap the rewards of their talents and the 
greater complexity of their roles (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014; Kaplan and Rauh 
2013; Mankiw 2013). An aspect of the knowledge economy, particularly in new digital 
technologies, that reinforces this dynamic is the existence of large networks effects, 
whereby the value of a product rises the greater number of users it has (e.g. social 
media platforms). Network effects often lead to the creation of winner-take-all or 
winner-take-most markets, where the first mover gets a disproportionate amount of 
the returns in an industry (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014). 
 
2.2. Labour market institutions and inequality 
 
Institutional factors such as de-commodification, trade union density, wage 
coordination, and collective bargaining have been found to shape the patterns of 
inequality in the advanced democracies, particularly cross-national variation (Brady, 
Baker, and Finnigan 2013; Brady and Leicht 2008; Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; 
Pontusson, Rueda, and Way 2002; Wallerstein 1999).  
In an empirical study of OECD countries, Wallerstein (1999, 676) finds that “the 
more wage and salaries are set in a centralized manner, the more egalitarian the 
distribution of wages and salaries”. The three theoretical channels that Wallerstein 
(1999) identifies as explaining this relationship are the economic explanation (i.e. 
wage differentials in decentralized wage-setting systems are inefficient), political (i.e. 
compressed wages in centralized wage-setting systems reflect the preferences of the 
median wage-earner), and the norms explanation (i.e. centralized bargaining 
influences norms around fairness). 
There is substantial evidence that labour unions, in their roles as both wage 
bargainers and political actors, influence class-based inequity in politics and public 
policy, and therefore reduce economic disparities (Ahlquist 2017). The top 1% are not 
typically union members or covered by collective bargaining agreements, but these 
institutions can still provide a brake on the incomes of top executives. Huber, Huo, and 
Stephens (2017) argue that union strength  reduces the proportion of the firm surplus 
that goes to executives, and greater worker discretion and performance in unionized 
workplaces can lessen the need for highly paid managers and supervisors. The 
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authors’ panel data analysis finds that policy and political variables, such as union 
density, are closely associated with the incomes of the most affluent households. 
As well as industrial relations systems, there is evidence that employment 
protection legislation (EPL) can influence the distribution of income. Checchi and 
García-Peñalosa (2008) find that OECD countries with stricter employment protection 
legislation, where workers are much harder to fire, typically have lower levels of 
household income inequality. 
 
2.3. The interaction of labour market institutions and the knowledge economy 
 
The previous two subsections have highlighted the vast literature on the direct effects 
of the transition to the knowledge economy and labour market institutions on income 
inequality in advanced democracies. However, the literature looking at whether the 
relationship between the expansion of knowledge-intensive services and income 
inequality depends on national labour market institutions is much less developed. To 
the best of our knowledge, there have been no cross-national empirical studies that 
investigate whether labour market institutions mitigate the inequality-enhancing effects 
of the transition to the knowledge economy. Despite the lack of panel data analyses 
into the relationship, the literature has identified several theoretical channels that 
provide clear motivation for focusing our study on the interaction between labour 
market institutions and the knowledge economy. 
Oesch and Menés (2011) set out three explanations of occupational change in 
advanced economies in the 1990s and 2000s. The institutional explanation suggests 
that the effects of technological change on the occupation structure and wage 
inequality vary depending on national wage-setting institutions. Acemoglu (2001) uses 
a model of non-competitive labour markets in which high-paid and low-paid jobs 
coexist to develop this argument. He shows that the incentive for firms to invest in the 
productivity of low-skilled workers is higher when labour market institutions have 
created a high wage floor for low-skilled workers.  
The upgrading of the employment structure in countries with more coordinated 
industrial relations systems and more generous welfare states occurs through greater 
training and technology adoption. This leads to improvements in productivity that push 
low-skilled wages closer to the national median, and hence reduces economy-wide 
wage dispersion (Oesch 2015). Lloyd, Weinkopf, and Batt (2010) find evidence of 
these effects in a multi-country case study of call centre workers in Europe. Through 
a series of in-depth interviews and workplace observations, they discover that call 
centre employees in the United Kingdom, which has few labour market protections 
and little collective representation, are less skilled, have less complex and diverse 
roles, and are paid less relative to the median, than call centre employees in Denmark 
and France. 
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EPL protects labour market insiders, those with secure employment often working 
in core sectors of the economy (Rueda 2005). Martelli (2017) argues that EPL 
insulates workers in the middle of the income distribution from the routinization 
associated with technological change and finds evidence that EPL contains the wage 
effects associated with job polarization. 
Labour market institutions can also restrain the incomes of the most affluent 
households in the knowledge economy. In liberal market economies, such as the 
Anglo-Saxon economies, labour markets are largely deregulated, bargaining takes 
place at the firm level, and managers have full discretion over hiring and firing. These 
highly fluid labour markets provide employers with little incentive to make long-run 
investments in training or employment (Hall and Soskice 2001). As liberal market 
economies shifted further toward shareholder value maximization strategies with the 
transition to the knowledge economy and the associated expansion of the financial 
sector, this gave management a clear motivation to reduce costs and push up short-
term profitability through mass layoffs, outsourcing and cuts in the wages of rank-and-
file employees (Fligstein and Shin 2007; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013). This 
dramatically changed the bargaining power between management and workers in 
these economies, shifting compensation towards top managers and CEOs, whose 
incomes were often tied into the value of corporate shares (Goldstein 2012). In 
contrast, the more coordinated economies of continental Europe and Scandinavia did 
not have labour market institutions or corporate governance structures conducive to 
firm strategies centred on short-term profits, so were better able to rein in the incomes 
of the richest in society (Roberts and Kwon 2017). 
 
3. Data and measures 
 
Our empirical analysis uses an unbalanced panel dataset covering 18 OECD countries 
from 1970 to 2007. The countries included in the sample—Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US—vary markedly in their 
industrial relations systems (Pontusson 2005), and more broadly, in the organization 
of their political economies (Hall and Soskice 2001; Schneider and Paunescu 2012; 
Thelen 2014). 
 
3.1. Dependent variable 
 
We use two measures of income inequality as our dependent variables. The first is 
the income share of the top 1% from the World Wealth and Income Database 
(Alvaredo et al. 2016). The second is the 90–10 wage ratio, which is the ratio of gross 
earnings received by a worker at the 90th earnings percentile to that received by a 
worker at the 10th percentile. This is taken from the OECD Labour Force Statistics 
(Brady, Huber, and Stephens 2014). Both our income inequality measures are before 
taxes and transfers (i.e. prior to government redistribution), which is appropriate for a 
III Working paper 18                                               David Hope and Angelo Martelli 
 
13 
 
study looking at the effects of the knowledge economy and labour market institutions 
on wage dispersion. 
The income share of the top 1% and the 90–10 wage ratio have been used in 
many previous cross-national studies on the determinants of income inequality (e.g. 
Huber, Huo, and Stephens 2017; Roberts and Kwon 2017; Rueda and Pontusson 
2000; Wallerstein 1999). We chose these measures as our dependent variables for 
two reasons. First, they have superior data availability over other measures of income 
inequality, especially over time, which is crucial for panel data analysis; and second, 
they allow us to test the effects of our key independent variables on different parts of 
the income distribution. The top 1% income share looks solely at the most affluent 
people in society. It is calculated using tax returns, and because it avoids top coding, 
it captures income growth at the very top of the income distribution much better than 
traditional measures based on household surveys (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2011). 
In contrast, the 90–10 wage ratio better captures income inequality across the whole 
workforce and is fairly closely correlated with other widely-used measures of 
inequality, such as the Gini coefficient (Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997; Rueda and 
Pontusson 2000). It has clear advantages over the Gini coefficient for our study, 
however, as it is less liable to measurement error, because it does not incorporate the 
hard to measure tails of the income distribution, and it is insensitive to “wage 
differentials among observationally equivalent workers”, which is essential to 
accurately estimate the effect of labour market institutions on income inequality 
(Wallerstein 1999). 
The data availability, and therefore the samples, vary slightly for the two 
measures. The sample for the regression models using the top 1% income share 
covers 15 countries (no data is available from the World Wealth and Income Database 
for Austria, Belgium or Greece) and 541 country-year observations. The sample for 
the regression models using the 90–10 wage ratio covers all 18 countries, but as this 
measure typically has shorter time series, the sample only has 322 country-year 
observations. 
 
3.2. Key independent variables 
 
The previous studies that estimate the effects of the knowledge economy on income 
inequality have used a range of different measures. Kwon and Roberts (2015) utilize 
the International Labour Organization’s measure of knowledge employment (as a 
percentage of the total labour force), which categorises workers based on their 
occupations. Knowledge employees are the combination of managers, professionals, 
technicians and associate professionals. In contrast, Rohrbach (2009) and Huber, 
Huo, and Stephens (2017) construct measures of employment in knowledge sectors 
(using OECD STAN and EUKLEMS data respectively) by adding up employment in 
sectors they deem to be knowledge-intensive. The definitions chosen by these authors 
differ. Rohrbach (2009) includes high-tech manufacturing industries in her definition, 
whereas Huber, Huo, and Stephens (2017) focus solely on services. Huber, Huo, and 
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Stephens (2017) definition includes sectors that are traditionally dominated by 
government provision, such as public administration, health and education.2 
The measure of the knowledge economy used in our study follows Wren’s (2013a) 
definition of dynamic services, which combines the sectors that have seen the greatest 
diffusion of new information and communications technologies. Table 1 shows the 
average contribution to value added growth of ICT capital services across sectors for 
12 advanced democracies between 1983 and 2006. Three sectors stand out as having 
significantly higher ICT contributions: post and telecommunications, financial 
intermediation (covering finance and insurance), and renting of machinery and 
equipment and other business activities (which is dominated by business services 
such as legal, technical, computer, and advertising services). Our measure of 
knowledge-intensive services adds up employment in these three sectors and 
expresses it as a percentage of total employment. 
Our knowledge-intensive service sectors have other characteristics that set them 
apart from the other service sectors. Wren (2013a) finds that they typically have higher 
productivity growth and are more likely to be traded internationally. This is no 
coincidence. The ICT revolution has drastically reduced the cost of performing routine 
programmable tasks (Nordhaus 2007), which has pushed up productivity in ICT-
intensive sectors (Dahl, Kongsted, and Sørensen 2011; Spiezia 2012; Stiroh 2002). It 
has also lowered many of the technical barriers to trade in services, because digitized 
information can be almost costlessly stored and transported across the globe (Choi 
2010; Freund and Weinhold 2002). 
We believe Wren’s (2013a) measure of the knowledge employment is superior to 
the measures used in the previous panel data studies on the determinants of income 
inequality for three main reasons. First, these sectors have seen dramatic employment 
expansion across the advanced democracies since the collapse of the Fordist system 
(see Figure 1). Second, the knowledge-intensive sectors are selected through a 
transparent data-driven procedure (see Table 1). Lastly, the theoretical and empirical 
literature summarised in the previous section identifies ICT as the central mechanism 
that connects the transition to the knowledge economy to changes in the income 
distribution (e.g. Acemoglu and Autor 2011; Goos, Manning, and Salomons 2014; 
Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenen 2014). 
 
 
 
                                                             
2
 This is likely why Huber, Huo, and Stephens (2017) find a negative effect of knowledge employment 
on income inequality, which contrasts with the other studies (Kwon and Roberts 2015; Roy Kwon 2016; 
Rohrbach 2009), because the empirical literature suggests that greater public sector employment can 
reduce income inequality, especially in coordinated market economies (Pontusson 2005; Pontusson, 
Rueda, and Way 2002; Rueda and Pontusson 2000). 
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Table 1. The contribution of ICT capital services to value added growth across 
sectors in 12 advanced democracies, 1983 – 2006 
Sector 
Average contribution of ICT 
capital services to value added 
growth (percentage points) 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 0.074 
Mining and quarrying 0.205 
Manufacturing 0.411 
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.401 
Construction 0.169 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.558 
Hotels and restaurants 0.269 
Transport and storage 0.487 
Post and telecommunications 1.739 
Financial intermediation 1.512 
Real estate activities 0.126 
Renting of machinery and equipment and other business 
activities  1.173 
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 0.427 
Education 0.237 
Health and social work 0.226 
Other community, social and personal services 0.569 
Note:  The advanced democracies included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, 
France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Source: EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts: November 2009 Release, updated March 2011; 
O’Mahony and Timmer (2009). 
 
The other key independent variables are the four measures of labour market 
institutions. We take the coordination of wage-setting and the adjusted bargaining (or 
union) coverage rate from the ICTWSS database (Visser 2016). The former measures 
the degree of coordination of wage setting on a five-point scale running from firm-level 
bargaining through to formal or informal centralised bargaining that sets explicit 
minimum or maximum rates of wage growth. The latter measures the proportion of all 
employees with the right to bargaining that are covered by collective (wage) bargaining 
agreements. We collect data on trade union membership from joint database compiled 
by the OECD and Jelle Visser (2013). Trade union density measures the proportion of 
employees that are members of trade unions. Finally, we use the OECD Labour Force 
Statistics measure of employment protection legislation for workers on permanent 
contracts, which is expressed on a 0-6 scale with higher values indicating that workers 
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are harder to dismiss. Previous cross-country comparative studies have found that 
these labour market institutions reduce wage dispersion in the advanced democracies, 
both below the 90th percentile (Checchi and García-Peñalosa 2008; Kwon and Roberts 
forthcoming; Martelli 2017; Pontusson, Rueda, and Way 2002; Roberts and Kwon 
2017; Wallerstein 1999) and between the top 1% and the rest (Flaherty 2015; Huber, 
Huo, and Stephens 2017; Roberts and Kwon 2017). 
 
3.3. Control variables 
 
In our models with controls, we include a selection of additional variables that have 
been found to be drivers of income inequality in the theoretical and empirical literature. 
The variables cover the broad areas of education, partisanship, financialization, 
globalization and the economy. 
Goldin and Katz (2007, 2008) argue that the post-industrial era in the United 
States has been marked by both a rise in the demand for higher education and a 
slowdown in educational expansion. The excess demand for educated labour created 
by education losing the race against technology creates upward pressure on the 
wages of more educated workers. The Goldin–Katz hypothesis has been found to hold 
across the advanced democracies (Huber and Stephens 2014). We include two 
measures of education in our analysis to account for both the expenditure on 
education and the human capital of the workforce. The first is education expenditure 
as a percentage of gross national income from the World Bank Development 
Indicators, and the second is the human capital index from the Penn World Tables 
(Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015). 
The partisanship variable we use is the share of parliamentary seats of secular 
parties of the centre and right as a proportional of all seats of the governing parties. 
The measure is cumulative since 1946 until the year of observation, and hence, higher 
values indicate the prolonged incumbency of these parties. Huber, Huo, and Stephens 
(2017) and Brady and Leicht (2008) find that right party power drives up income 
inequality. 
Many panel data studies find that higher levels of financialization are associated 
with greater income inequality in the advanced democracies (Flaherty 2015; Godechot 
2016; Kus 2012; Roberts and Kwon 2017). Finance is one of the sub-sectors within 
our measure of knowledge-intensive services (see Section 3.2). To ensure that 
financialization is not driving our main results, we therefore control for stock market 
capitalisation as a percentage of GDP (from Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenström 2009) 
and private credit as a percentage of GDP (from the Financial Development and 
Structure Dataset; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2000, 2009; Čihák et al. 2012). 
These measures control for aspects of the growth of the financial sector over the post-
Fordist era that affect inequality through different channels to those hypothesised for 
the broader knowledge-intensive services sector (as set out in the literature review), 
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such as the increased use of stock options in the compensation packages of top 
managers and CEOs and the dramatic rise in household borrowing. 
Another secular trend that has taken place alongside the transition to the 
knowledge economy is globalization. Goods and capital markets have become 
considerably more integrated over time, which has had knock on effects for inequality. 
We control for three different aspects of globalization: exposure to trade, outward 
investment flows and import competition from China. Exposure to trade is measured 
by total trade (exports plus imports) as a percentage of GDP and is taken from the 
OECD Annual National Accounts. It is common to control for trade openness in cross-
country studies into the determinants of income inequality (Huber, Huo, and Stephens 
2017; Huber and Stephens 2014). Investment outflows are measured by outward 
foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP. Alderson and Nielsen (2002) and 
Lee, Nielsen, and Alderson (2007) find that higher outward investment flows lead to 
greater income inequality. The rise of China as a global exporting powerhouse has 
been one of the major features of the post-industrial era. Empirical studies have found 
that Chinese import competition has adverse consequences on labour markets and is 
positively associated with income inequality in the advanced democracies (Autor, 
Dorn, and Hanson 2013; Van Reenen 2011; Thewissen and van Vliet 2017). We 
measure Chinese import penetration by the value of manufactured goods (SITC Rev 
1. 5-8) imports from China as a percentage of GDP (calculated using data from the 
UN COMTRADE database and the OECD National Accounts). 
Lastly, we control for conditions in the labour market using the unemployment rate 
as a percentage of the civilian labour force (from the OECD Labour Force Statistics) 
and for the level of economic development using GDP per head at current prices and 
current PPPs (from the OECD Annual National Accounts). The summary statistics for 
the two dependent variables, the key independent variables and the control variables 
are shown in Table 2 (for a complete list of variable definitions and sources, see Table 
A1 in the Appendix). The small amount of missing values across the dataset have 
been linearly interpolated. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Top 1% income share 541 0.09  0.03  0.04  0.20  
90–10 wage ratio 322 3.04 0.67 1.88 4.86 
Dynamic services employment  
(% of total employment) 682 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.22 
Wage coordination (1 – 5 scale) 669 3.25 1.40 1.00 5.00 
Union density (%)  659 40.41 19.71 7.55 83.86 
EPL (0 – 6 scale) 414 2.20 0.99 0.26 5.00 
Bargaining coverage (0 - 100) 614 70.62 24.38 12.61 98.00 
Education expenditure (% of GNI) 684 4.63 1.32 1.00 8.29 
Human capital index 684 2.89 0.44 1.40 3.66 
Secular centre and right  
government (%) 655 20.40 16.22 0.07 62.00 
Stock market capitalization 
(% of GDP) 525 0.49 0.41 0.00 2.70 
Private credit (% of GDP) 682 74.80 38.22 16.93 192.82 
Trade openness (% of GDP) 684 0.59 0.30 0.11 1.75 
Outward FDI (% of GDP) 628 2.16 3.98 -4.70 47.01 
Chinese import competition  
(% of GDP) 631 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 
Unemployment rate 684 6.92 3.88 0.57 24.17 
GDP per capita ($US, current  
prices, PPP) 684 17,170  10,090  2,080  47,987  
 
4. Empirical strategy 
 
The data for our analysis is unbalanced time series cross-sectional (TSCS) data 
covering 18 OECD countries. We employ Prais–Winsten regressions as our empirical 
strategy, which have been widely used in the empirical literature investigating the 
determinants of inequality in advanced democracies (Huber, Huo, and Stephens 2017; 
Kwon and Roberts 2015, forthcoming; Volscho and Kelly 2012). Prais–Winsten 
regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and include both panel 
corrected standard errors (PCSEs) and a correction for first-order auto-regression. 
The approach helps mitigate the problems of serial correlation, group-wise 
heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation that are common 
in regression analyses using TSCS data (Beck and Katz 1995, 2011; Plümper, 
Troeger, and Manow 2005). 
Our empirical strategy has clear advantages over other widely used approaches. 
Beck and Katz (1995) use Monte Carlo experiments to show that for the types of TSCS 
data used in comparative politics, OLS models with panel corrected standard errors 
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provide more accurate estimates of standard errors than feasible generalized least 
squares estimation, and entail little loss of efficiency. We deal with serial correlation 
by including a correction for first-order autocorrelation, which is preferable to the 
alternative approach of adding a lagged dependent variable, which would absorb 
much of substantively interesting variation in our TSCS data and risk biasing the 
coefficient estimates on our main independent variables (Huber, Huo, and Stephens 
2017; Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005). 
Given that our unit of analysis in our TSCS data is countries, we also include 
country fixed effects in our regressions, which control for unobserved, time-invariant, 
country-specific factors that influence inequality. Country fixed effects help guard 
against omitted variable bias and are commonly employed in Prais–Winsten 
regression models (Huber, Huo, and Stephens 2017; Kwon and Roberts forthcoming). 
For the reasons outlined, we believe our empirical strategy is the most appropriate for 
our TSCS data, but as a robustness check, alternative specifications are also tested. 
Tables A2 to A4 in the Appendix shows the results of Prais-Winsten regressions with 
country fixed effects and decade dummies, as well as fixed and random effects 
estimators. 
The equations estimated in the empirical analysis are: 
 
(1)  𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑊𝑖𝑡 +𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    
(2)  𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑊𝑖𝑡 +∑𝛽𝑘 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.   
 
In both sets of models, yit refers to our measures in income inequality: the income 
share of the top 1% and the 90–10 wage ratio. The main independent variables in the 
analysis are 𝑋𝑖𝑡, the share of total employment in knowledge-intensive services, and 𝑊𝑖𝑡, our measures of labour market institutions. The interaction of our main 
independent variables, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑊𝑖𝑡, is crucial for testing the main hypotheses of the paper. 
Our four labour market institutions are tested in separate regression models; all of 
which also include country-fixed effects, 𝛿𝑖, and an intercept term, 𝛽0. The second set 
of models also include a vector of 𝑘 control variables, represented by 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝑘. 
 
5. Results 
 
The results for the top 1% income share are shown in Table 3. Models 1 to 4 show the 
results from the baseline regressions, which simply include our main independent 
variables and an interaction term, as well as country-fixed effects. In all four models, 
knowledge employment is positively associated with the income share of the top 1% 
and significant at the 99% level. The interaction effects between knowledge 
employment and the four labour market institutions are all negative, but the effects are 
only statistically significant for wage coordination, employment protection legislation 
and bargaining coverage (but not union density). The baseline results tentatively 
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support the hypothesis that the presence of strong labour market institutions reduces 
the effect of the transition to the knowledge economy on top incomes shares. 
Models 5 to 8 in Table 3 introduce a full set of control variables. These models 
take account of other important drivers of inequality, covering human capital, 
government partisanship, financialization, globalization, and the state of the economy. 
The results show that the effects of the expansion of knowledge employment on the 
income share of the top 1% is conditional on the strength of labour market institutions. 
The interaction effects for all the labour market institutions aside from union density 
are significant, negative, and of a similar magnitude to the baseline regressions. Only 
two of the control variables are statistically significant across three or more of the 
models: stock market capitalization and Chinese import competition. 
The results in Table 4 show the same eight regression models, but with the 90–
10 wage ratio as the dependent variable. The same patterns emerge for the main 
independent variables. In all eight regression models, knowledge employment is 
positively associated with the 90–10 wage ratio and highly statistically significant. The 
interaction effects are also negative and significant in the baseline models and the 
models with controls for wage coordination, employment protection legislation and 
bargaining coverage. Table 4 therefore provides evidence that the presence of strong 
labour market institutions helps mitigate the wage dispersion across the labour force 
that comes with the transition to the knowledge economy. 
From Models 5 to 8 in Table 4, we can see that different control variables exert 
consistent, statistically significant effects on the 90–10 wage ratio than did on the 
income share of the top 1%. Human capital and trade openness are both consistently 
negatively associated with the 90–10 wage ratio. 
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Table 3. Knowledge employment, labour market institutions, and the income share of the top 
1% (Prais–Winsten regressions) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Knowledge employment 0.525*** 0.271*** 1.063*** 0.607*** 0.240** -0.064 0.212 0.495*** 
Wage coordination 0.005***   
    
0.007***     
  
Union density   -0.001*** 
    
  -0.001***   
  
EPL     0.015***       0.014*** 
  
Bargaining coverage     
  
0.000       0.001** 
Wage coordination *  
Knowledge employment -0.059
***
     
  
-0.078***     
  
Union density *  
Knowledge employment   -0.002     
  
0.001   
  
EPL *  
Knowledge employment     -0.207
***
   
    
-0.112*** 
  
Bargaining coverage *  
Knowledge employment       -0.004
**
 
      
-0.007*** 
Education expenditure         0.000 0.000 0.002* 0.001 
Human capital          -0.004 -0.015 0.029** 0.009 
Secular centre and  
right government         0.001
*
 0.001*** 0.001 -0.000 
Stock market 
capitalization         0.015
***
 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 
Private credit         -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** 
Trade openness         -0.014 -0.016* -0.009 -0.018* 
Outward FDI         -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
Chinese import 
competition         0.558
**
 0.446* -0.005 0.536* 
Unemployment         -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000** 
GDP per capita         0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
Constant 0.039*** 0.125*** 0.001 0.041 0.097** 0.181*** -0.044 0.025 
 0.84 0.86 0.77 0.87 0.72 0.78 0.60 0.77 
R2 0.57 0.57 0.69 0.55 0.75 0.71 0.87 0.72 
Observations 538 538 342 503 456 456 299 441 
Note: Prais–Winsten regressions (panel-corrected standard errors and ar(1) corrections) with country fixed effects in all models. 
Unbalanced panel using data from 1970-2007. Pairwise option used to compute the covariance matrix. Knowledge employment 
comprises three sectors: post and telecommunications; financial intermediation; and renting of machinery and equipment and other 
business activities. * P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05 and *** P < 0.01. 
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Table 4. Knowledge employment, labour market institutions, and the 90–10 wage ratio (Prais–
Winsten regressions) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Knowledge employment 7.935*** 4.671*** 8.465*** 7.694*** 9.590*** 6.350** 8.554** 5.640** 
Wage coordination 0.165*** 
      
0.196*** 
      
Union density 
  
-0.001 
      
0.006 
    
EPL     0.263**   
    
0.204 
  
Bargaining coverage       0.007* 
      
0.003 
Wage coordination *  
Knowledge employment -1.576
***
       -1.822*** 
      
Union density *  
Knowledge employment   -0.058
***
     
  
-0.043 
    
EPL *  
Knowledge employment     -2.675
***
   
    
-2.319** 
  
Bargaining coverage *  
Knowledge employment       -0.070
***
 
      
-0.054** 
Education expenditure         0.006 0.001 0.039*** 0.002 
Human capital          -1.050*** -0.810*** -0.244 -0.975*** 
Secular centre and  
right government         0.004 0.005 -0.011
**
 -0.002 
Stock market capitalization         0.046* 0.057* 0.052* 0.021 
Private credit         -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Trade openness         -0.550*** -0.619*** -0.672*** -0.293 
Outward FDI         0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Chinese import competition         2.687 1.124 7.713* -2.424 
Unemployment         0.003 -0.000 -0.002 -0.006 
GDP per capita         0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
Constant 2.668*** 2.554*** 3.076*** 1.860*** 4.866*** 4.355*** (omitted) 5.336*** 
 0.70 0.72 0.64 0.71 0.60 0.61 0.43 0.63 
R2 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.97 
Observations 320 320 255 314 275 275 216 270 
Note: Prais–Winsten regressions (panel-corrected standard errors and ar(1) corrections) with country fixed effects in all models. 
Unbalanced panel using data from 1970-2007. Pairwise option used to compute the covariance matrix. Knowledge employment 
comprises three sectors: post and telecommunications; financial intermediation; and renting of machinery and equipment and other 
business activities. * P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05 and *** P < 0.01.
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Figures 3 and 4 show the estimated effects of a 1 percentage point increase in 
employment in knowledge intensive services as a percentage of total employment on 
our two measures of inequality when our three statistically significant labour market 
institutions are at the maximum and minimum values observed in the sample (see 
Table 2). We can see that for the income share of the top 1%, an increase in 
knowledge employment is associated with an increase in inequality when labour 
market institutions are very weak and a reduction in inequality when labour market 
institutions are very strong (see Figure 3). The effects are largest when employment 
protection legislation is extremely strict, but the maximum value pertains only to 
Portugal between 1985 and 1989. Outside of Portugal, EPL is rarely above 3 in our 
sample. 
Similar patterns emerge for the 90–10 wage ratio, but in this case, even the 
maximum values of wage coordination and bargaining coverage are not sufficient to 
reverse the positive association between expansion of knowledge employment and 
wage inequality (as they were with the top 1% income share). The figures show that 
the effects of the expansion of knowledge employment on the top 1% income share 
are greatest when bargaining coverage is at its lowest value, whereas the effects are 
greatest for the 90–10 wage ratio when wage coordination and EPL are at their lowest 
values. Overall, these marginal effects figures highlight the role that strong labour 
market institutions can have in mitigating the inequality associated with the transition 
to the knowledge economy. 
 
Figure 3. Estimated effect on the income share of the top 1% of a one percentage 
point increase in the share of knowledge employment 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations; for data sources for underlying regression analysis, see Table A2 in the appendix. 
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Figure 4. Estimated effect on the 90–10 wage ratio of a one percentage point 
increase in the share of knowledge employment 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations; for data sources for underlying regression analysis, see Table A2 in the appendix. 
 
The results of the robustness tests are shown in Table A2 to A4 in the Appendix. We 
can see that the main results of the analysis are unaffected by the empirical strategy 
chosen. The variables of theoretical interest exhibit the same relationships when we 
include decade dummies to our Prais–Winsten regressions (Table A2) or when we 
use fixed effects (Table A3) and random effects (Table A4) estimation. Most 
importantly, for both dependent variables, the interaction effects between knowledge 
employment and wage coordination, employment protection legislation and bargaining 
coverage are all negative and statistically significant at (at least) the 95% level. 
The control variables that are found to influence the two measures of inequality 
differ only slightly from our preferred empirical specification of Prais–Winsten 
regressions with country dummies. The finding that Chinese import competition is 
positively associated with top incomes is not robust to alternative specifications, 
whereas a negative effect of private credit on top incomes is consistently found in the 
robustness checks. Stock market capitalization is found to exert a consistent positive 
effect on the top 1% income share, just as in the main results, but unlike the main 
results, it is also positively associated with the 90–10 wage ratio across the alternative 
specifications. The negative relationships between human capital and trade openness 
and the 90–10 wage ratio are also robust to alternative estimation techniques. In 
addition, the GDP per capita is consistently positively associated with the 90–10 wage 
ratio in the alternative specifications. 
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6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
The ICT revolution and the transition to the knowledge economy in the advanced 
democracies has created winners and losers. Workers with university education and 
the most affluent households have reaped much of the gains, often at the expense of 
those workers lower down the income distribution with jobs that can be easily 
substituted by machines and computers. The dominant narrative in the emerging 
comparative political economy literature on the knowledge economy is that the 
complementarities between skilled and semi-skilled workers that underpinned 
industrial relations systems in the Fordist era have been so undermined by the ICT 
revolution that strong labour market institutions are no longer the main guarantor of 
wage solidarity across the labour force (Iversen and Soskice 2015; Martin and Thelen 
2007; Thelen 2014). 
Our empirical analysis of 18 advanced democracies between 1970 and 2007 
challenges that argument by showing that the presence of strong labour market 
institutions played an important role in mitigating the upward pressure on income 
inequality from the transition to the knowledge economy. We find that the effects of 
expanding knowledge employment on both the income share of the top 1% and the 
90–10 wage ratio are moderated by more coordinated wage bargaining, stricter 
employment protection legislation and higher bargaining coverage. Our results 
complement the wider empirical literature that finds that industrial relations systems 
and the power of organized labour can limit wage dispersion across the workforce 
(Pontusson, Rueda, and Way 2002; Wallerstein 1999) and constrain the income 
growth of the most affluent households in society (Huber, Huo, and Stephens 2017). 
However, we go beyond the previous literature by showing that labour market 
institutions effects in the post-industrial era operated through their capacity to 
counteract the pressures on wage solidarity arising from the rapid expansion of 
knowledge-intensive service sectors. 
While the results for the main independent variables were consistent across the 
two measures of inequality, the control variables that exhibited consistent, statistically 
significant effects across specifications varied markedly between the two measures. 
The capitalization of the stock market was positively associated with rising top 
incomes, which supports the voluminous empirical literature on the effects of 
financialization on income inequality (Flaherty 2015; Godechot 2016; Kus 2012; 
Roberts and Kwon 2017), and reflects the increasing use of stock options as CEO 
compensation over the post-Fordist period in both liberal and coordinated market 
economies (Huber, Huo, and Stephens 2017). The finding that Chinese import 
competition pushes up the incomes of the top 1% is striking and warrants further 
investigation, as the focus of most of the previous empirical studies have been on the 
adverse effects on the bottom and middle of the income distribution (Autor, Dorn, and 
Hanson 2013; Thewissen and van Vliet 2017). Turning to the results for the 90–10 
wage ratio, we see that trade openness and human capital are negatively associated 
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with wage dispersion. The trade openness finding suggests that different aspects of 
globalization have different effects on wage inequality, and that exposure to 
international trade actually reduces wage inequality across the bottom 90% of the 
income distribution. The human capital finding supports the Goldin–Katz (2007, 2008) 
hypothesis and the theory of skills-biased technological change (Acemoglu and Autor 
2011; Katz and Autor 1999). 
The analysis presented in this paper has several important limitations that point to 
fruitful avenues for future work. The Prais–Winsten regression models pin down the 
importance of labour market institutions for mitigating the inequality effects of the 
transition to the knowledge economy, but have a limited amount to say about the 
underlying mechanisms. Our cross-country comparative analysis would therefore be 
nicely complemented by micro-level empirical analyses or qualitative case study 
analyses into how labour market institutions have interacted with the expansion of 
knowledge employment to ensure greater wage solidarity in Scandinavia and some 
parts of continental Europe than elsewhere. The extent to which producer groups have 
adapted their strategies and forms of coordination in the knowledge economy is also 
hard to ascertain from the high-level, national measures of labour market institutions 
used in this study, and requires further investigation. Lastly, the empirical analysis is 
constrained by the time series availability of the income inequality measures and the 
unavailability of comparable data on knowledge employment past 2007. If and when 
this data becomes available, an updated empirical analysis should be carried out. 
This paper makes an important contribution to the growing body of comparative 
work that looks at how national institutions can condition the effects of structural 
changes in the economy on income inequality in advanced democracies (Iversen and 
Soskice 2015; Kwon and Roberts forthcoming; Roberts and Kwon 2017; Thelen 2014). 
We provide evidence against the argument that labour market institutions are 
redundant in the knowledge economy; in fact, we find that they can alleviate the 
upward pressure on income inequality arising from the continued shift of workers in 
advanced democracies into high-value added, ICT intensive, service sectors. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Variable descriptions and sources 
Variable Variable description Source 
Top 1% income share Top 1% income share, based on pre-tax incomes World Wealth & Income Database (data 
accessed September 2017) 
90–10 wage ratio 
Ratio of gross earnings received by a worker at 
the 90th earnings percentile to that received by a 
worker at the 10th percentile 
Brady, Huber and Stephens (2014); OECD 
Labour Force Statistics (accessed 14 Jan 2013) 
Knowledge employment  
(% of total employment) 
Employment in dynamic services as a share of 
total employment (using Wren’s (2013a) 
definition of dynamic services) 
EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts: 
November 2009 Release, updated March 2011; 
O’Mahony and Timmer (2009) 
Wage coordination  
(1 – 5 scale) 
Coordination of wage-setting  
(1-5 scale) — a measure of the degree of 
coordination, ranging from firm-level bargaining 
(1) to fully centralized bargaining (5) 
J. Visser, ICTWSS Data base. version 5.1. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Advanced 
Labour Studies (AIAS), University of 
Amsterdam. September 2016 
Union density (%)  
The ratio of wage and salary earners that are 
trade union members, divided by the total 
number of wage and salary earners 
OECD and J. Visser, ICTWSS database 
(Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, 
Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social 
Pacts, 1960-2010), version 3.0 
EPL (0 – 6 scale) 
Strictness of employment protection: individual 
and collective dismissals  
(regular contracts) (0-6 scale) — higher values 
denote stricter regulation 
OECD Labour Force Statistics (data accessed 
June 2017) 
Bargaining coverage  
(0 - 100) 
Employees covered by collective (wage) 
bargaining agreements as a proportion of all 
wage and salary earners in employment with the 
right to bargaining, expressed as a %, adjusted 
for the possibility that some sectors or 
occupations don’t have the right to bargain 
J. Visser, ICTWSS Data base. version 5.1. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Advanced 
Labour Studies (AIAS), University of 
Amsterdam. September 2016. 
Education expenditure  
(% of GNI) 
Adjusted savings: education expenditure  
(% of GNI) 
World Development Indicators, The World Bank 
(data accessed September 2017) 
Human capital index Human capital index, based on years of 
schooling and returns to education Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015) 
Secular centre and right  
government (%) 
Cumulative share of parliamentary seats of 
secular center and right parties as a proportion of 
the seats of all governing parties 
Brady, Huber and Stephens (2014); Mackie and 
Rose (1991), annual election reports and issues 
of the Political Data Yearbook published by the 
European Journal of Political Research since 
1986, IDEA Voter Turnout Database 
Stock market 
capitalization  
(% of GDP) 
Stock market capitalization: market value of 
publicly listed stocks divided by GDP Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenström (2009) 
Private credit (% of 
GDP) 
Private credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions (as a % of GDP) 
Financial Development and Structure Dataset 
(June 2017 version); Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Levine (2000, 2009); Čihák et al. (2012) 
Trade openness  
(% of GDP) Total trade (exports plus import) (as a % of GDP) 
OECD Annual National Accounts (data 
accessed June 2017) 
Outward FDI (% of 
GDP) 
Outward foreign direct investment  
(as a % of GDP) 
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) FDI Database  
(data accessed September 2017) 
Chinese import 
competition  
(% of GDP) 
Chinese import penetration: value of 
manufacturing imports from China  
(SITC REV 1. 5-8) as a % of GDP 
United Nations COMTRADE Database (data 
accessed September 2017) 
Unemployment rate Rate of unemployment as a % of the civilian labour force 
OECD Labour Force Statistics (data accessed 
September 2017) 
GDP per capita ($US, 
current prices, PPP) GDP per head, current prices, current PPPs 
OECD Annual National Accounts (data 
accessed September 2017) 
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Table A2. Robustness tests: Determinants of the income share of the top 1% and the 90–10 
wage ratio (Prais–Winsten regressions with decade dummies) 
 Income share of the top 1% 90-10 wage ratio 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Knowledge employment 0.255*** -0.109 0.218 0.476*** 9.955*** 6.852*** 8.466** 6.866** 
Wage coordination 0.008***       0.199***       
Union density   -0.001***       0.007     
EPL     0.014***       0.190   
Bargaining coverage       0.001***       0.005 
Wage coordination *  
Knowledge employment -0.087
***
       -1.822***       
Union density *  
Knowledge employment   0.001       -0.047     
EPL *  
Knowledge employment     -0.114
***
       -2.208**   
Bargaining coverage * 
Knowledge employment       -0.007
***
       -0.062** 
Education expenditure 0.000 -0.001 0.002* 0.000 0.008 0.004 0.039*** 0.004 
Human capital  0.004 -0.000 0.032*** 0.020 -1.120*** -0.857*** -0.272 -1.008*** 
Secular centre and right 
government 0.001
**
 0.001*** 0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.003 -0.011** -0.005 
Stock market 
capitalization 0.015
***
 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.052* 0.060** 0.052* 0.027 
Private credit -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000** -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Trade openness -0.014 -0.016* -0.012 -0.016* -0.495** -0.562** -0.649*** -0.236 
Outward FDI -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Chinese import 
competition 0.366 0.217 -0.072 0.360 5.207 4.248 8.473
*
 0.253 
Unemployment -0.001** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008* 
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
1980s -0.004* -0.005*** -0.000 -0.004** 0.053* 0.056** 0.007 0.052* 
1990s -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 0.059 0.063 0.014 0.040 
2000s -0.001 -0.001 omitted -0.001 0.022 0.022 omitted -0.004 
Constant 0.076** omitted omitted -0.001 omitted 4.243*** 4.573*** 4.748*** 
 0.68 0.68 0.59 0.72 0.58 0.61 0.43 0.61 
R2 0.78 0.77 0.88 0.76 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.97 
Observations 456 456 299 441 275 275 216 270 
Note: Prais–Winsten regressions (panel-corrected standard errors and ar(1) corrections) with country fixed effects in all models. 
Unbalanced panel using data from 1970-2007. Pairwise option used to compute the covariance matrix. Knowledge employment 
comprises Post and Telecommunications; Financial Intermediation; and Renting of Machinery & Equipment and Other Business 
Activities. * P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05 and *** P < 0.01. 
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Table A3. Robustness tests: Determinants of the income share of the top 1% and the 90–10 
wage ratio (random effects models) 
 Income share of the top 1% 90-10 wage ratio 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Knowledge employment 0.388*** -0.056 0.054 0.343*** 12.768*** 10.334*** 8.333*** 8.847*** 
Wage coordination 0.016***       0.232***       
Union density   -0.000**       0.006     
EPL     0.013***       0.071   
Bargaining coverage       -0.000       0.003 
Wage coordination *  
Knowledge employment -0.170
***
       -1.992***       
Union density *  
Knowledge employment   -0.003
**
       -0.056**     
EPL *  
Knowledge employment     -0.066
**
       -1.428   
Bargaining coverage *  
Knowledge employment       -0.003
***
       -0.059*** 
Education expenditure -0.001 0.001 0.002* -0.002** 0.008 0.000 0.068*** 0.006 
Human capital  0.005 0.005 0.025*** -0.010** -1.384*** -1.206*** -0.700*** -1.220*** 
Secular centre and right 
government 0.000
**
 0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000 0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.002 
Stock market 
capitalization 0.021
***
 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.016*** 0.100*** 0.124*** 0.085*** 0.075*** 
Private credit -0.000* 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
Trade openness -0.004 -0.011** -0.013* -0.017*** -0.641*** -0.639*** -0.635*** -0.281* 
Outward FDI -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 
Chinese import 
competition 0.353 -1.307
***
 -0.159 -0.240 -3.576 -7.046* 4.812 -10.33*** 
Unemployment -0.000* -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.001 -0.009* -0.007 
GDP per capita 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000 0.000*** 
Constant 0.017 0.062*** -0.048* 0.106*** 5.592*** 5.472*** 4.250*** 5.678*** 
R2 (within) 0.69 0.50 0.74 0.58 0.67 0.57 0.37 0.65 
R2 (between) 0.35 0.76 0.31 0.70 0.09 0.09 0.23 0.19 
R2 (overall) 0.53 0.66 0.40 0.67 0.07 0.14 0.39 0.09 
Observations 456 456 299 441 275 275 216 270 
Note: Unbalanced panel using data from 1970-2007. Knowledge employment comprises Post and Telecommunications; Financial 
Intermediation; and Renting of Machinery & Equipment and Other Business Activities. * P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05 and *** P < 0.01. 
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Table A4. Robustness tests: Determinants of the income share of the top 1% and the 90–10 
wage ratio (fixed effects models) 
 Income share of the top 1% 90-10 wage ratio 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Knowledge employment 0.374*** -0.231** -0.049 0.577*** 13.009*** 12.684*** 10.095*** 12.431*** 
Wage coordination 0.017***       0.234***       
Union density   -0.001***       0.012**     
EPL     0.014***       0.140   
Bargaining coverage       0.001***       0.010*** 
Wage coordination *  
Knowledge employment -0.170
***
       -2.008***       
Union density *  
Knowledge employment   0.002
**
       -0.085***     
EPL *  
Knowledge employment     -0.053       -1.994
**
   
Bargaining coverage *  
Knowledge employment       -0.008
***
       -0.096*** 
Education expenditure -0.001 -0.004*** 0.002* -0.001 0.007 0.001 0.066*** 0.005 
Human capital  0.021** 0.027** 0.042*** 0.044*** -1.408*** -1.237*** -0.492** -1.211*** 
Secular centre and right 
government 0.000 0.001
***
 0.001* -0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.011* -0.013** 
Stock market  
capitalization 0.022
***
 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.100*** 0.129*** 0.089*** 0.075*** 
Private credit -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
Trade openness -0.005 -0.011 -0.009 0.004 -0.680*** -0.763*** -0.837*** -0.345** 
Outward FDI -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.000 -0.002 
Chinese import 
competition 0.508
**
 0.488* -0.061 0.383 -3.495 -6.727 7.243* -9.579*** 
Unemployment -0.001** -0.000 0.000 -0.001** 0.007 0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
GDP per capita 0.000 -0.000 0.000** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 
Constant -0.024 0.053* -0.090*** -0.089*** 5.644*** 5.284*** 3.663*** 5.294*** 
R2 (within) 0.69 0.59 0.74 0.63 0.67 0.58 0.39 0.65 
R2 (between) 0.26 0.49 0.17 0.18 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.02 
R2 (overall) 0.43 0.51 0.27 0.28 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.00 
Observations 456 456 299 441 275 275 216 270 
Note: Unbalanced panel using data from 1970-2007. Knowledge employment comprises Post and Telecommunications; Financial 
Intermediation; and Renting of Machinery & Equipment and Other Business Activities. * P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05 and *** P < 0.01. 
